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Litigation Risk Broadly Considered
Jerry D. Sullivan
Public Oversight Board
There is little doubt that litigation risk associated with the audit of financial
statements, as well as other attestation assurances, is presently at a level that
threatens the viability of the public accounting profession and is contrary to the
public interest. A decade ago, it was infrequent to encounter a report of auditor
litigation in the financial press. Today, it is virtually a daily occurrence.
A decade ago, when the Auditing Standards Board was debating and finalizing Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in
Conducting an Audit, an appropriate distinction was made between audit risk
and audit exposure which is essentially litigation risk. The auditor was cautioned that when litigation risk was assessed as low, less extensive procedures
should not be performed than would be otherwise required under generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Today, litigation risk is never assessed as
low and the aforementioned cautionary note might be better restated to suggest
that the auditor would be well advised to consider performing more extensive
procedures than might otherwise be required by GAAS when auditing public
companies.

The Current Environment
Small firms are divesting themselves of attest engagements, large firms are
performing risk assessments of their clientele and resigning from "risk engagements" and curtailing many attest services, such as assurances on prospective
financial information. Senior executives of the Big Six firms lament the fact that
divesting themselves of smaller, lesser developed and more risky small public
companies is contrary to the public interest as these entities are often in need of
the most sophisticated assistance in producing reliable financial information.
The actual cost of litigation involving the accounting profession has not been
calculated, but it has reached proportions that threaten the solvency of even the
largest firms. Spokesmen for the Big Six firms (those firms are involved in most
of the litigation involving public companies) claim its aggregate cost is second
only to human resources. Costs of defense on some cases have exceeded
$15,000,000. Document reproduction alone is often in excess of $2,000,000 a
case. The projected costs of defense for many cases have reached a level that
indicate settlement is economically prudent even when the firm believes it has
adequate defenses.
Two recent highly publicized cases, the MiniScribe Corp. litigation involving Coopers & Lybrand and the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association litigation involving Ernst & Young, illustrate the level of stakes involved and the
incentive for firms to settle.
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A recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal 1 reported:
The Texas King of Torts did it again, just as the Vice President was
renewing his campaign to reform the lawyers.
Mr. Jamail's latest spin at the lottery wheel of American justice is a
good example of the excesses. He won a $550 million judgment against
MiniScribe Corp., $530 million of it in punitive damages, from a
Galveston jury last week. This 25-to-1 ratio of punitive to actual damages
is typical of a legal system out of control, which is why Mr. Quayle wants
states to limit punitives to an amount equal to the actual harm.
MiniScribe is in bankruptcy, so much of the ruinous judgment would
be paid by its former accountants at Coopers & Lybrand and former
investment bankers at Hambrecht & Quist—who point out they were also
defrauded, for much more than Mr. Jamail's bondholder clients. It's also
an irony that it was an internal investigation by MiniScribe that uncovered
the falsifying of records by some of its employees. So whom is the legal
system punishing for what by assessing punitive damages? The jury, by
the way, decided Mr. Jamail should get some $8 million for his labors.
The MiniScribe verdict was later overturned by the state judge presiding
over the case to facilitate a settlement among Coopers & Lybrand, Hambrecht
& Quest and the plaintiffs for an undisclosed amount, thus avoiding a costly
appeals process.
In another recent Wall Street Journal article2 the following was reported:
The nation's second largest law and accounting firms agreed to pay a
total of $87 million to settle investors' fraud claims arising from the collapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan Association....
The investors' lawyers said in opening statements to a jury that they
would claim $350 million in losses. Under Arizona's racketeering statutes
and California's punitive damages laws, both of which could be applied in
the case, potential liability could be tripled.
That prospect led in part to the settlements, lawyers for the two firms
said. "The taint that affects anyone who had any dealings with Charles
Keating is so black that it is asking a great deal for a jury to understand
that auditors, too, can be victim," said Laurence Popofsky, a San
Francisco lawyer for Ernst & Young.
A coalition of securities firms, insurance companies, accounting firms, law
firms, corporate directors, and other business organizations is working to seek
litigation reform, involving such matters as proportionate liability, fee shifting,
and discovery procedural reforms. Tort reform efforts, even if ultimately successful, are likely to move slowly.
The large accounting firms are presently accumulating aggregated cost data
relating to litigation costs to support their efforts for reforms. However, much
more may be needed. For example, firms are reporting that the existing litigation environment is having an adverse impact on entry level recruiting and their
ability to retain competent partner level personnel. However, no empirical evi1
Amy Williams, "Ernst & Young and Jones Day Law Firm to Pay $87 Million in Lincoln Savings
& Loan Case," The Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1992, p. A3.
2
AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 561, "Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing of Date
of Report."
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dence has been gathered to substantiate or refute their claims.
There are other areas where it may be possible to develop empirical evidence
to augment the proposition that the current level of litigation risk the accounting
profession faces is not in the public interest. I would like to suggest one area.
My hypothesis is that the accounting profession's litigation risk does not correlate to substandard performance (audit risk). The data and arguments I present
in support of my hypothesis suffer from the same shortcomings academic
research on auditor litigation has encountered—incomplete data for analysis
because of the high incidence of settlement before adjudication. Nevertheless, I
hope that this paper will suggest the need for further research and identify areas
that might be further explored by those of you who are more expert in research
methodology than I.
Both the peer review process and the investigation of allegations of audit
failure involving public registrants by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee
(QC1C) provide an opportunity to identify some data relevant to the quality of
audits performed by member firms of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).

Peer Review Results
As part of the peer review of member firms of the SECPS, engagements are
selected and reviewed to determine whether they comply with professional standards and the firm's quality control system. The engagement selection involves
a consideration of risk factors related to the firm, such as industry concentration
of clients, new engagements, partner workload and experience, and other control risk and inherent risk factors related to the firm's practice. The engagement
reviews are in sufficient depth, and the Public Oversight Board's oversight
process is sufficiently vigorous, to provide reasonable assurance that they lead
to a consistent and objective identification of audit failures when they exist
among the engagements reviewed.
During the peer review of engagements, an audit is determined to be substandard if the peer reviewer concludes (1) that one or more auditing procedures
considered necessary at the time of the audit in the circumstances then existing
were omitted3 or (2) that the audited financial statements are materially misleading, or the auditor's report inappropriate, thus requiring recall and revision.4
This forensic dissection of engagements as part of the peer review process
provides an indication of the incidence of audit failure among firms that are
members of the SECPS. Table 1 summarizes the results of engagements
reviewed during the most recent three peer review years (1989-91). While the
data relating to 1991 peer reviews is incomplete, that year completes the current
cycle for the peer review of large firms and the partial data summarized to date
about substandard engagements is somewhat enlightening.
When analyzing substandard performance in the context of litigation risk, it
is necessary to distinguish between AU Section 390 failures and AU Section
561 failures. Substandard engagements summarized as AU Section 390 failures
are only those engagements in which, after performance of the omitted proce3

AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of Internal Control Structure
Related Matters Noted in an Audit."
AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 390, "Consideration of Omitted Procedures After the
Report Date."

4
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Table 1
SECPS Peer Review Engagement Review Results (1989 - 1991)

1989

1990

1991

Engagements Reviewed
Engagements Determined to be
Substandard:
AU 390
AU 561
Engagements
Engagements
Substandard:
AU 390
AU 561
Engagements
Engagements
Substandard:
AU 390
AU 561

Reviewed
Determined to be

Big Six
Firms
340

Other
Firms
1157

12
8

2

10
8

1909

298

Total
1497

10
11
Reviewed
Determined to be
30
18

-

-

1
114

-

1611
10
10

30
18

* The Peer Review Committee has not yet processed all 1991 peer reviews and
the data relating to other than Big Six firms is incomplete.
dure(s) by the practitioner, it was determined that neither the financial statements were materially misleading nor was the auditor's report inappropriate.
Therefore, those relying on the auditor's report were not misled and damaged.
Thus, only substandard performance summarized as an AU Section 561 failure
should, in an ideal world, correlate with litigation risk, since only in those
instances could a financial statement user be misled and damaged.
Over the three year period (1989-91) involving 742 engagement reviews of
Big Six firms, only one engagement was identified as an AU Section 561 failure
(.13% of the engagements reviewed). During 1989 and 1990, a total of 2,768
engagement reviews of non-Big Six firms were conducted and twenty such
engagements were identified as AU 561 failures (.7% of the engagements reviewed). Many of the substandard engagements involving audits conducted by
non-Big Six firms during 1990 and 1991 were by firms having their initial peer
review as a result of the AICPA bylaw change mandating SECPS membership
for all firms that audit SEC registrant companies (sixteen of twenty-one substandard engagements identified in 1990 and forty-five of the forty-eight substandard engagements identified to date in 1991).
The conclusion that can be drawn from an analysis of the incidence of audit
failure identified in the peer review program is that litigation risk should be
much lower than the profession presently experiences. It is estimated that the
Big Six firms report on approximately 12,000 public companies annually. The
sole substandard engagement identified in the 942 engagement reviews of Big
Six firms was a small eleemosynary institution audit that was not subjected to
the same quality control procedures applied to public company audits (for
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example, concurring partner review). Therefore, a "worst case" projection of
audit failure involving public companies would be sixteen (.13% of 12,000
audits), whereas the actual number of complaints filed against Big Six firms
involving their audits of public companies annually is approximately three
times that number. The only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that litigation risk does not correlate to substandard performance by the profession.

QCIC Investigations
When a lawsuit involves the audit of a public company (or an entity where
there may be a public interest, such as a savings and loan institution), it is the
QCIC's responsibility to determine if the allegations suggest an aberrational
error, a shortcoming in the firm's quality control or its compliance with them, or
a shortcoming in professional standards. Member firms must report to the QCIC
all litigation or regulatory proceedings involving audits of public companies or
regulated financial institutions within thirty days of receiving a complaint.
The QCIC's proceedings, conducted in strict confidence, do not determine
the merits of a case or the culpability of any party. Rather, their purpose is a
review of the firm's policies and procedures to assure that, when appropriate,
the firm takes measures to upgrade its controls and compliance with them. In
conducting its proceedings, the QCIC may interview firm personnel, inspect
firm policy and guidance material, and examine selected workpapers to determine the need for corrective action by the firm or by standard-setters.
QCIC cases are not closed until the committee is satisfied that a firm has
properly addressed any weaknesses discovered in its quality control system and
that matters that require consideration by the accounting and auditing standardsetting bodies have been reported for their consideration. The Public Oversight
Board oversees all QCIC inquiries into alleged audit failures. Its staff reviews
both the plaintiff's allegations and the QCIC staff's analysis of them. Board
members and/or its staff attend meetings between firms reporting litigation and
QCIC task force members, and participate in discussions about committee
recommendations.

Table 2
QCIC Cases Reported
Cumulative
Cases Reported
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992 (8 Months)

10

12
29
31
36
42
44
44
42
53
56
44
40
53

Annual Average
10.0
11.0
19.0
23.0
25.6
28.3
30.5
31.7
32.9
34.9
36.9
37.4
39.2

Table 2 presents a tabulation of the number of cases reported to the QCIC since
its inception. Because of the sensitivity of QCIC proceedings and concerns
about their threat to "live" litigation, most documentation is destroyed shortly
after a case is closed. The only documentation retained is a copy of the complaint and the staffs analysis of the allegations. Since most cases are not adjudicated, it is impossible to accumulate data relating to the outcome of reported
cases, particularly data relevant to a determination of audit failure. However, an
analysis of the complaints provides some data relevant to the environment in
which litigation occurs and an understanding of what areas of financial reporting plaintiff's counsel believes to be deficient. Ninety cases reported to the
QCIC during the period 1989 through 1991 were selected for analysis. Forty of
the cases selected for analysis involve the audits of financial institutions. Table
3 summarizes data found from a review of the complaints about the parties
involved in the litigation and actions taken by the auditor. Table 4 summarizes
data about the allegations in those cases.

Table 3
Analysis of Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC
Information About Parties and Auditor Action

Total Cases
Auditor:
Big Six Firm
Second Tier
Other
Financial statements restated
or auditor withdrew opinion
Auditor resigned or was terminated
Auditor reported modified opinion on
financial statements:
Ability to continue as going concern
Other
Company condition when complaint was filed
or end of class period:
Bankruptcy
Severe decline in earnings and security value

Financial
Institution
Cases
40

Other
50

35
4
1

42
3
5

5
11

7
8

11
9

5
9

23
13

15
35

27
4
3
3
4
1

38
4
4
1
1
2

Plaintiff:
Security holder
Company management
New management
Creditor
Government agency
Insurer
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Table 4
Analysis of Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC
Information About Allegations

Total Cases
Existence of Management Fraud
Internal Controls:
Material weakness not identified by auditor
Weaknesses not adequately considered
when performing the audit
Weaknesses not communicated by auditor
Principal Financial Statement or Auditor
Report Defect:
Revenue recognition
Valuation of assets
Adequacy of loan loss reserve
Disclosure
Fraudulent transaction
Report not modified for continued existence
Not obvious

Financial
Institution
Cases
40
11

Other
50
14

1

18

16
6

8
2

3
12
26
3
2
2
6

13
26
3
6
1
6

Litigation Risk Does Not Correlate to Audit Risk
In the QCIC cases analyzed, all of the non-financial institution cases and
ninety-six percent of the financial institution cases involved bankrupt entities or
entities experiencing severe declines in their security values. The implication is
that auditors' substandard performance correlates to financial difficulty of the
entity being audited, i.e., the profession can perform well in profitable and
financially successful environments, but not so in financially troubled environments. This is of course a ludicrous proposition, but is easily explained. The
objective of plaintiff's lawyers litigation directed at auditors is settlement, not
adjudication of the allegations.
Most cases are resolved through settlement. Cases are settled at a "going
rate" of approximately one quarter of the potential damages claimed.5 Plaintiffs'
lawyers are sophisticated in identifying potential class actions. Armed with
computers they identify potential class actions where a decrease in security
price produces a market loss sufficient to support an adequate level of fees. In
discussing this phenomenon Alexander explains:
Twenty million dollars is about the lowest potential recovery (damage
claim) that could be expected to generate an attorney's fee sufficient to
justify maintaining a complex securities class action on a contingent fee
5

Janet Cooper Alexander, "Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Security Class
Actions," Stamford Law Review, Volume 43:497, February 1991, pp. 513-14.
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basis. Assuming that settlements can be expected to be approximately
25% of the claimed loss...attorneys fees can be expected to be about 2030% of the recovery. (Page 513)
Alexander's research shows that most suits are filed when a fee in the range
of $1.25 million or more could be expected. Critics can find degrees of imperfection in virtually every audit. The sufficiency and competence of evidential
matter influencing the auditor's judgment about the reporting entity's financial
statements is not only a matter of professional judgment but it is also fact-dependent and will vary from audit to audit. These judgments about the sufficiency and competence of evidence, particularly relating to the valuation assertion,
are focused on by plaintiff's counsel and most often underlie allegations charging auditors with substandard performance, when in fact, the litigation is motivated by the "plaintiff's bar settlement model."
Among the financially troubled and bankrupt population of companies, there
are no doubt occasional instances of substandard performance by the auditor.
There are other situations involving highly sophisticated management fraud
where both the auditor and third parties have been deceived where the auditor's
responsibility for material irregularities in financial statements is less obvious.
Damaged parties will always contend that the auditor should have detected
fraud and this expectation gap is fueled by occasional highly publicized cases
where, based on the reported facts, it appears that an alert, experienced audit
team should have identified related "red flags." When conducting QCIC investigations directed at evaluating the adequacy of and compliance with firms' quality control systems, we occasionally suspect a "busted audit." However, far more
often the investigations lead us to the conclusion that the litigation is "frivolous."

Other Observations About QCIC Cases
Continued Existence
Among the fifty non-financial institution QCIC cases examined, sixteen
entered into a form of bankruptcy proceedings. The auditors for five of the sixteen bankrupt entities modified their opinion for concerns about the ability to
continue as a going concern during the financial reporting year preceding bankruptcy. The auditors for seven of the thirty-four non-bankrupt entities modified
their opinions on the financial statements for concerns about the ability to continue as a going concern.
The above suggests that the auditor's "red flag" identifying going concern
problems in the audit report may have little utility because of the inherent
inability to identify entities that will become insolvent in the volatile marketplace and economy in which business operates. Further, it is interesting to note
that the plaintiff's attorney alleged failure by the auditors to provide a "red flag"
in only one of the eleven bankruptcies that was not accompanied by an auditor's
opinion modified for substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a
going concern.
Audit Evidence
None of the ninety QCIC cases examined suggest that the auditor did not
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identify evidence relating to the allegations, with the exception of the identification of "side agreements" related to a number of financial institution audits.
This suggests the sufficiency of audit procedures applied by the profession for
identifying evidential matter about which an audit judgment must be made. The
allegations, for the most part, call into question the auditor's judgment about the
evidence identified in the audit, particularly valuation judgments and income
recognition matters. Table 4 summarizes the allegations.
As firms in recent years have revised their audit approaches to be consistent
with the SAS No. 47 risk model, similarities in audit methodology are more
apparent than differences. An example of this is that all of the large firms now
use non-statistical sampling plans to the virtual exclusion of statistical sampling
plans. During the most recent cycle of Big 6 firm peer reviews that have included 742 engagement reviews, we do not recall seeing one statistical sampling
application. The most plausible reason for this is that non-statistical sampling
plans are less expensive and experience has demonstrated the sufficiency of
audit evidence identified by them.
Statistical sampling plans are still used for a limited number of special purpose applications, usually involving the requirements of governmental agencies.
These applications are usually planned and assisted by specialists in the firms.
Academics, when planning their research projects and class syllabi, should consider the limited use of statistical sampling, and quantitative techniques generally, in the audit of financial statements.
Management Integrity and Internal Control
In fourteen of the fifty non-financial QCIC cases examined, there was an
allegation of management fraud. Among the fourteen cases involving an allegation of management fraud, eleven allegations related to entities with revenues of
less than $100 million (six of which had revenues of less than ten million dollars). Most of the smaller entities involved owner-manager dominance.
The Internal Control—Integrated Framework, Revised Draft (February
1992), of the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO), indicates that management integrity and ethical values
are an integral component of internal control. Unfortunately, these attributes
cannot be evaluated based on any known objective criteria. They are personal
qualities, not processes like risk assessment, and reasonable men can differ
greatly about their acceptability. Public reporting on the adequacy of internal
controls, including attributes of management integrity and ethical values in the
control structure, is both questionable and dangerous. It is not reasonable to
expect that management will ever evaluate its members as lacking in these personal attributes, nor will it be possible for others to do so, except in the most
egregious situations-and well after the fact.
In discussing its application to small entities, the draft COSO report states,
for example:
Although small and even mid-size companies may find it difficult to
bring outside directors on to the board, absence of such directors (or an
audit committee) does not necessarily create a weak control environment.
A board that consists solely of an entity's officers and employees who
report to the owner-manager can adequately perform necessary governance, guidance, and oversight responsibilities....
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Thus, the draft COSO report suggests that not only can management of small
companies evaluate objectively their own integrity and ethical values, as well as
the adequacy of other components of the entity's control system, they can do so
and report to the public without the oversight of an independent audit committee. Owners of smaller companies, once choosing to raise capital in the public
markets, should be required to have audit committees with independent members to assist in safeguarding the interests of absentee equity and debt stakeholders. A failure of a public company to do so should be regarded as a serious
deficiency in its internal control structure.
COSO recommends that the threshold for modifying the report should be an
uncorrected material weakness. Many of the components of internal control
identified by COSO, such as integrity, ethical values and an absence of audit
committees, do not easily lend themselves to the concept of a material weakness. The likely result of management reporting following the COSO guidance
is that reporting entities will routinely provide "clean reports," and auditors will
be called upon to provide assurance on these reports, even when there are
numerous significant deficiencies in the control structure identified as
"reportable conditions."6 This suggests that the plaintiff's bar in future litigation
will more routinely allege that the management of various companies and their
auditors have misled and damaged third parties because of assertions about the
adequacy of internal controls where significant deficiencies have been identified. To minimize this danger, there should be an acknowledgment in public
reports that weaknesses in internal control have been identified and are being
addressed by management.

The Auditor's Opinion
After years of controversy, criticism and deliberation, the Auditing Standards
Board revised the auditor's standard report in 1988, the first revision in thirtyeight years. The revision was directed primarily at more clearly explaining the
elements of an audit and the degree of assurance being provided by the auditor.
The nature of allegations in auditor litigation suggests another revision may be
in order.
The sufficiency and competence of evidential matter available to assess management's assertions about sensitive valuation judgments often do not reduce
audit risk sufficiently to justify the degree of assurance being provided in the
auditor's report on historical financial statements. The following is an example.
The evidential matter available to the auditor to support a judgment about the
carrying value of a financial institution's loan or equity participation in a real
estate project under development is limited primarily to an evaluation of: (a) the
developer's reputation and financial stability, the latter usually being highly
dependent on the success of the project being considered; (b) assumptions relating to market feasibility; and (c) costs incurred to date related to percentage
of completion estimates and additional development funds available.
If the auditor was requested to provide assurance to a third party in a separate
financial presentation related to the real estate project, the presentation would
be cast as a financial forecast and the auditor's report would include a caveat
6

AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of Internal Control Structure
Related Matters Noted in an Audit."
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that the prospective results are dependent on assumptions that may not be
achieved. Yet, the same assets included in a historical financial statement would
result in the auditor expressing a clean opinion on the valuation assertion related
to the project.
This dichotomy in auditor assurance cannot be theoretically justified nor
rationally supported. It should be no surprise that the auditing profession is
being held culpable for the savings and loan debacle by the financial press,
Congress, investors and government agencies, and more recently for the failure
of many banks. The financial collapse of many of these entities resulted directly
from their equity participation in and loans to real estate projects. The auditor's
assurances about the valuation assertions related to these projects was at the
same level as assurance provided on the carrying value of the cash account.

Conclusion
The accounting profession has a unique role in society as a provider of third
party assurances on the reliability of client-prepared financial information. In
meeting this responsibility, the profession has found itself beset with increasing
litigation risk that more directly correlates to the financial difficulties of some
clients than to its own substandard performance. Unlike the statistical dispersion
of malpractice actions against other professionals, the accounting profession's
litigation risk is concentrated among a limited number of firms that audit most
public companies. While the litigation risk of these firms is increasing, audit
risk appears to be managed in a way that limits substandard performance to a
reasonably low level, particularly in firms that have mature quality control systems meeting the membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section.
The accounting profession must continue to strive to even further lower the
incidence of substandard performance. However, it is unreasonable and, in the
long run, contrary to the public interest in reliable financial reporting for the
legal system to operate in a way that encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to bring
actions against accountants on the basis of a calculation of loss in client security
values necessary to support a profitable settlement. This results in accounting
firms being penalized for the financial troubles of their clients rather than substandard performance and leads to an unwarranted erosion of confidence in the
profession as well as its financial viability.
This paper identifies a few facets of the accounting profession's litigation
risk relating to attest performance and reporting that may warrant research by
the academic community; there are undoubtedly others. Research and other
scholarly inquiries may assist in bringing about reforms to our legal system or
minimizing the profession's exposure to it.
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